Research on the H5N1 avian influenza viruses resumed last week after a year-long ban.

Following the lifting of the research pause, scientists are resuming studies to enhance H5N1 transmissibility among mammals, aiming to accelerate vaccine development in case of a potential pandemic.

Risk modelling experts at RMS are warning that pursuing this 'gain-of-function' approach inherently increases the threat of an accidental, man-made outbreak.

RMS has used its infectious disease model to simulate scenarios for pandemics that could result from the escape of a virus from a research laboratory. It estimates that there is a small but significant likelihood of an escaped lab pathogen triggering a global pandemic.

“Laboratory experimentation remains controversial because of the possibility of creating a super flu that might not have occurred naturally. The H5N1 influenza virus is highly virulent and rapidly mutating, and its evolution, through either natural or laboratory means, could pose the most significant pandemic threat of the modern era,” said Dr Maura Sullivan, senior director of LifeRisks at RMS.

The modelling firm says that while the probability of a pandemic remains low, insurance companies should ensure they have sufficient capital to manage the risk.

Commenting on the implications for insurers, Dr Andrew Coburn, senior vice-president of LifeRisks at RMS, said: “In the long run, if this research results in good vaccines, then it could reduce pandemic risk by 30%, but in the short term the research itself poses an increased risk. For risk managers looking to stress test their Solvency II capital requirements, RMS’ model indicates that an additional five per cent in capital may be required to compensate for a possible man-made pandemic occurring as a result of the lifting of the research ban.”

H5N1 has infected over 600 people globally (typically via direct contact with an infected bird) and has killed around 60% of those infected. According to RMS’ analysis, a H5N1 virus that is as transmissible as the 1918 Spanish flu could result in tens of millions of deaths worldwide.

H5N1 influenza research currently requires biosafety level three laboratories rather than the maximum security level four. Researchers are resisting upgrading to level four because they argue that it will slow research progress.

Historical laboratory-acquired infections demonstrate that biosafety measures occasionally fail.

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